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Summary findings
Paradoxically, when economists analyze a policy's impact  They find that Russian adults with higher family
on welfare they typically assume that people are the best  income per equivalent adult are less likely to place
judges of their own welfare, yet resist directly asking  themselves on the lowest rungs of the subjective ladder
them if they are better off. Early ideas of "utility" were  and more likely to put themselves on the upper rungs.
explicitly subjective, but modern economists generally  But current household income does not explain well
ignore people's  expressed views about their own welfare.  self-reported assessments of whether  someone is poor or
Even using a broad set of conventional socioeconomic  rich. Expanding the set of variables to include incomes at
data may not reflect well people's  subjective perceptions  different dates, expenditures, educational attainment,
of their poverty.  health status, employment, and average income in the
Ravallion and Lokshin examine the determinants of  area of residence doubles explanatory power.
subjective economic welfare in Russia, including its  Healthier and better educated adults with jobs perceive
relationship to conventional objective indicators. For  themselves to be better off, controlling for income.
data on subjective perceptions, they use survey responses  The unemployed view their welfare as lower, even
in which respondents rate their level of welfare from  with full income replacement.
"poor"  to "rich" on a nine-point ladder.  Individual income matters independent  of per capita
As an objective indicator of economic welfare, they use  household income.
the most common poverty indicator in Russia today, in  Relative income also matters. Living in a richer area
which household incomes are deflated by household-  lowers perceived economic welfare, controlling for
specific poverty lines.  income and other factors.
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Praag.1.  Introduction
It is a paradox that when economists  analyze  the welfare  impacts  of policies,  they
typically  assume that people  are the best  judges of their own  welfare,  yet they resist directly
asking people  themselves  whether  they  are better off. It is assumed  instead  that the economist
knows the answer on the basis of objective  data on incomes  and prices. While early ideas  of
"utility"  were explicitly subjective, 2 the modem approach  in economics  has generally  ignored  the
expressed  views of people  themselves  about their own  welfare.
However,  the view that we can make interpersonal  comparisons  of welfare by looking
solely  at demand behavior  is known  to be untenable.  Households  differ in characteristics,  such as
size and demographic  composition,  which can influence  their welfare  in ways which  are not
evident  in their behavior  as consumers  (Pollak and Wales, 1979).  The problem stems from the
restrictions  economists  place  on the information  which is brought  to bear in measuring  welfare.
Responses  to survey  questions  on perceived  well-being  may well provide the extra
information  needed for identifying  welfare  (van Praag, 1991;  Kapteyn,  1994). There has been
work  by psychologists  and economists  on understanding  self-perceptions  of welfare.  The most
direct  and common  approach  is to survey  people's opinions  about  their own well-being,
assuming  that the answers  are inter-personally  comparable.  The questions  asked by subjective
welfare  surveys  have typically  related  to a broad  notion of "happiness"  or "satisfaction  with life".
The evidence  available  does not suggest  that the answers  given can be predicted  well by standard
2  Famnously,  Jeremy  Bentham  defined  utility  in terms  of psychological  states  (pleasure  and  pain).
On  the  distinction  between  "objective"  and  "subjective"  utility  see  Kahnman  and  Varey  (1991).
2objective  measures,  such as income. 3
However,  for many purposes,  including  policy  analysis, one is typically  interested  in a
more narrow  concept  of "economic  welfare";  is one person "poorer"  than another? Possibly
subjective  assessments  of this more  narrow  concept  will accord  better  with objective  data on
incomes.  A better understanding  of the determinants  of self-rated  economic  welfare  may also
help understand  the political economy  of economic  policy  making, such as why some  sub-groups
in society  appear  to be more opposed  to policy  change  than a conventional  calculation  of income
gains and loses would suggest.
This paper examines  the systematic  determinants  of subjective  economic  welfare  in
Russia, including  its relationship  to conventional  objective  indicators.  Our data on subjective
perceptions  use survey  responses  to a question  in which respondents  say what their level of
welfare  from "poor"  to "rich" is on a nine-point  ladder.  We make the standard  identifying
assumption  in analyzing  attitudinal  questions  that there is inter-personal  comparability  of the
interpretations  given to the survey  question;  in our case, a given  rung of the ladder is taken to
mean the same  thing to each person  in terms of a continuous  latent  measure of economic  welfare.
Of course,  there are still systematic  differences  in where people  place  themselves  on the ladder,
but these are interpreted  as arising  solely from differences  in their economic  welfare.  Our
objective  indicator  of economic  welfare  is the most common  poverty  indicator  in Russia today,
in which household  incomes are deflated  by household-specific  poverty  lines.
3  Simon  (1974)  found  a weak  association  between  income  and  subjective  welfare  in the U.S.,
and  survey  evidence  since  has generally  suggested  a significant  but low  correlation;  for a survey  see
Fumham  and  Argyle  (1998,  Chapter  11).  Also  see Scitovsky  (1978),  Easterlin  (1995)  and  Oswald  (1997).
3For a number of reasons, Russia is an interesting setting for this inquiry. The economic
and political reforms of the last decade had a profound impact on the well-being of Russian
households. A sharp drop of GNP was accompanied by a high level of inflation in the early
1990s, an increase in unemployment, and income inequality. The poverty rate rose sharply
(Lokshin and Popkin, 1997). The problem of identifying those living in poverty is of increasing
importance in Russia. Usually the problem is addressed by comparing household income with a
poverty line which varies according to the prices faced and household size and demographic
composition.  In practice, this method has tended to show that it is larger and younger families
that have higher incidence of poverty, and this finding has had considerable influence on anti-
poverty policies.  However, there appears to be a perception amongst many in Russia today that
poverty is more acute in older (particularly pensioner) and smaller households. This suggests that
there may well be disagreement between objective and subjective welfare indicators. We aim to
compare the two types of indicators and to better understand the source of any divergence.
The following section discusses alternative approaches to welfare measurement, and our
approach and data. Section 3 gives our results comparing the objective and subjective measures.
Section 4 tries to explain the differences. Section 5 concludes.
2.  Measuring economic welfare
The most widely used measure of a person's "economic welfare" is the real income of the
household to which the person belongs, adjusted for differences in family size and demographic
composition (relative to some reference, such as a single adult). This can be defined as the
household's  total income divided by a poverty line giving the cost of some reference utility level
4at the prevailing  prices and household  demographics.  Under  certain  conditions,  this ratio can be
interpreted  as an exact money  metric of utility defined over consumptions. 4
Standard  practice is to calibrate  the cost function from consumer  demand behavior.  It is
known,  however,  that there the parameters  of the cost function  are in general under-identified
from demand  behavior  when household  attributes  vary (Pollak  and Wales, 1979).5  This problem
has plagued  applied work, and the policy  interpretations  of data on economic  welfare including
"poverty  profiles" aiming to give consistent  measures  of poverty  across  sub-groups  of society.
For example, consider  one  property  of the cost function,  its elasticity  to household  size
when evaluated  at the reference  utility  level used to set the poverty  line. An elasticity  of unity is
equivalent  to dividing income  by household  size, while an elasticity  of zero implies that
aggregate  household  income is the relevant  indicator of individual  welfare.  There is evidence  to
support  the intuition that at some  critical  value of that elasticity  somewhere  between zero and
one, measured  poverty  will tend  to be uncorrelated  with household  size,  while at elasticities
above (below)  this critical value larger  (smaller)  households  will be deemed  poorer (Lanjouw
and Ravallion, 1995).  The same  evidence  indicates  that the range  of approaches  to determining
the size elasticity  of the cost function  found in practice spans  both sides  of this critical  elasticity,
4  See  Blackorby  and  Donaldson  (1987)  who  refer  to consumption  normalized  by a poverty  line
as the "welfare  ratio". The  main  assumption  required  for this  to be an exact  money  metric  of utility  is  that
the consumer's  preferences  are homothetic.
5 Also  see Pollak  (1991),  Blundell  and  Lewbel  (1991),  Browning  (1992),  and Kapteyn  (1994).
To  understand  the problem,  suppose  that  we  find  that  an indirect  utility  function  v(p,  y, x) (depending  on
prices  p, income  y and  other  household  characteristics  x) supports  observed  demands  q(p,  y, x) as an
optimum.  The indirect  utility  function  then  implies  a cost  function  c(p, x, u) for utility  u, such  that  the
objective  welfare  indicator  is y/c(p, x, ur)  for  the reference  utility  ui (interpretable  as the  poverty  line  in
utility  space).  However,  if v(p,  y,  x) implies  the demands  q(p,  y, x) then  so  does  every  other  indirect
utility  function  V(v(p,  y, x), x].
5so that one could  go from saying that larger  households  are poorer  to the opposite  depending  on
the way one identifies  the elasticity.
This indeterminacy  has bearing  on policy.  The demographic  poverty  profile is important
information  for a number of questions  in social  policy, such as the allocation  of public spending
between family  allowances  and pensions. The issue has been prominent  in discussions  of social
policy in Eastern  Europe. Yet sensitivity  tests on past objective  welfare indicators  for Russia and
other countries  in Eastern Europe  and Central  Asia suggest  that the demographic  profile of
poverty  can change  appreciably  with even seemingly  small changes  in the allowance  made for
scale economies  in consumption  within  the household  (Lanjouw,  Milanovic  and Paternostro,
1998).
Some  economists  have turned to data on self-perceptions  of welfare  as a source  of the
extra information  needed for identification.  There are various approaches.  Van Praag (1968,
197  1) introduced  the Income  Evaluation  Question  (IEQ) which  asks what income  is considered
"very  bad", "bad",  "not good",  not bad", "good",  "very  good".  Another  method  is based on the
Minimum  Income  Question (MIQ)  which  asks  what income is needed  to "make  ends meet".
Subjective  poverty  lines can be calibrated  to the answers  (see, for example,  Kapteyn  et al.,
1988).6  By this approach  the welfare  indicator  is still taken to be objectively  measured  income or
expenditure normalized by the (subjective) poverty line.
A common use of subjective welfare measures is to calibrate an objective welfare
measure, such as setting equivalence scales. Survey-based  subjective indicators are used to
6  Qualitative  data on consumption  adequacy  can also be used, without  the minimum  income
question  (which  is unlikely to give sensible  answers  in some settings)  (Pradhan  and Ravallion,  1998).
6identify the consumer's cost fumction (Van Praag and Van der Sar, 1988; Kapteyn, 1994). But
what variables should be included?  Even within a given approach to measuring subjective
welfare, the set of individual characteristics deemed relevant to the corresponding objective
welfare measure can differ. An objective welfare indicator chosen to have best fit in explaining a
subjective indicator may still leave worryingly large residuals.
Arguably the IEQ and MIQ are both motivated by a rather narrow, income-based,
characterization of welfare. This has been recognized explicitly in the literature. For example, in
estimating the Leyden poverty line using Russian data, Frijters and van Praag (1997) recognize
that "..income is only one factor among others influencing individual life satisfaction levels
Nevertheless, being economists, we'll assume that absolute and relative material circumstances
define poverty" (p.6).  They go on to calibrate their welfare metric to only a few variables -
income, household size, and age.
A more open-ended approach can be found in the psychological literature on subjective
perceptions of welfare. While the psychological literature has naturally tended to focus on mental
health, a strand of the literature has attempted to understand people's  self-rated welfare. 7
Respondents are asked to place themselves on a ladder - sometimes referred to as a Cantril
ladder, following Cantril (1965) - according to their "happiness" or "satisfaction with life a
whole." 8
7  See, for example,  Argyle (1987),  Diener  (1994),  Diener, Suh and Oishi (1997) and Furnham
and Argyle (1998).  A strand of the economics  literature  has drawn on subjective  assessments  of welfare,
following  Van Praag (1968, 1971).  (We discuss  this approach  in section 2 below.)  There is remarkably
little cross-referencing  of the literatures  in psychology  and economics.
8  For a useful  cross-country  compendium  of the questions asked, and a summary  of the answers,
see Veenhoven  et al., (1993).
7However, this is arguably too broad a concept for measuring economic welfare, and
assessing conventional income-based measures.  When one says that someone is "poor" one
typically does not mean that they are unhappy.  It cannot be too surprising that income is not all
that matters to "happiness" or "satisfaction with life". The more interesting question is how
income, and other objective characteristics of people, relate to self-perceptions of economic
welfare.
Here we adopt an alternative approach, in which the Cantril-type question is asked about
economic welfare.  In particular, we use the following question:
Please imagine a 9-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest
people, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand the rich. On which step are you today?
We will call this the Economic Ladder Question (ELQ). 9 The question serves the purpose of this
paper well. It does not presume that "income" is the relevant variable for defining who is "poor"
and who is not, but leaves that up to the respondent. At the same time, by using the words "poor"
and "rich" the question focuses on a more narrow concept of economic welfare than the "ladder
of life" questions often used in psychometric and other surveys. It does not appear plausible to
us that discrepancies between answers to the ELQ, as posed above, and an objective measure of
real income reflect the fact that they are aiming to measure different things.
Nonetheless, there are still ways in which the answers to the ELQ could deviate from
conventional real income metrics. The following reasons for divergence can be identified:
(i) There might well be systematic differences in the values attached to specific
9 An antecedent  is found in Mangahas  (1995)  who asked  respondents in regular surveys  for the
Philippines  whether  they are "poor",  "borderline"  or "non-poor".
8household characteristics in assessing differences in "'needs", i.e., differences in the structure of
the equivalence scales underlying the real income measure (as typically built into the poverty
lines used as deflators) versus those which affect perceptions of welfare.
(ii) The ladder question is individual specific, and there may well be inequality within
households not captured by aggregate household income or consumption.
(iii) There may be differences in the time period over which income is measured versus
the time period on which perceptions of economic welfare are based. Past incomes may matter,
as may expected future incomes, or determinants of these, such as education.
(iv)  There could also be differences arising from the influence of relative incomes on
perceptions of personal affluence. It has been argued that the circumstances of the individual,
relative to others in some reference group, influence perceptions of well-being at any given level
of individual command over commodities.10
(v) From psychological research it is known that subjective welfare is affected by both
transient and fixed idiosyncratic factors. Intrinsic aspects of temperament, such as extroversion
and neuroticism, influence self-rated welfare (see for example Costa and McCrae, 1980).
Transient effects also matter such as short-lived peaks of happiness and how a recent experience
ended (Fredrickson and Kahneman, 1993). For the purpose of assessing  a person's "typical"
welfare, there is clearly noise in subjective  welfare data. This presumably  also be the case for
subjective  economic welfare as assessed  by the ELQ.  We call this noise "mood effects".
To have any hope of understanding the systematic determinants of subjective economic
10 Runciman  (1966) provided  an influential  exposition,  and supportive  evidence.  Also see the
discussions  in van de Stadt et al., (1985),  Easterlin  (1995),  Frank (1997)  and Oswald  (1997).
9welfare one needs to have the above question (or something similar) asked in the context of a
comprehensive objective socio-economic survey. However, the resistance to subjective welfare
assessments in economics has been reflected in the nature of much of the socio-economic survey
data available."  The lack of integration of subjective methods into comprehensive survey
instruments has meant that it has not often been possible to examine the socio-economic
determinants of self-rated welfare, and the relationship with the more conventional welfare
measures favored by economists.
We shall use data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) for 1996.
The RLMS is a comprehensive survey of all aspects of levels of living, based on the first
nationally representative sample of several thousand households across the Russian Federation.'2
In addition to a wide range of more conventional socio-economic data, all adults were asked the
Economic Ladder Question discussed above.
As our main objective welfare indicator we use the "welfare ratio" given by total
household income (y) as a proportion of the poverty line (z),1 3 The distribution of such welfare
ratios determines the level of absolute poverty. (Almost all measures of poverty are
homogeneous of degree zero in incomes and the poverty line.) We use established poverty lines
I  For example,  until recently, the household  surveys  done for the World  Bank's Living
Standards  Measurement  Study  almost never  asked for subjective  assessments  of welfare,  even though
welfare  measurement  was the main aim of the surveys.
12  A range  of issues  related  to the sample  design  and collection  of these data are explained  in the
documents  found in the home  page of the RLMS,  where the data sets can also be obtained  free; see
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/rlms_home.html.
13  We use income  rather than consumption  because income  appears  to have  been more popular
in past work on poverty  in Russia; we leave aside  the issue of which is preferable.
10for Russia." 4 These used linear programming to find the food baskets which minimized the cost
of reaching predetermined age- and gender-specific nutritional norms, subject to the constraint
that the quantities obtained were no lower than certain positive bounds given by the averages for
those with the lowest 30% of consumption. The food basket was created separately for children
aged 0-6, 7-17, adult males and females, female pensioners aged 55 and older, and male
pensioners aged 60 and older. Region-specific food prices were then used to cost these food
baskets.  Age- and gender-specific Engel coefficients were then used to obtain allowances for
non-food spending. Thus, each age and gender grouping has its specific poverty line which is
used to construct a household-specific poverty line according to the demographic composition of
the household.  Total real monthly disposable household income (in June 1992 prices) includes
wages and salaries, social security, private transfers, income in-kind and from home production.
3.  Comparing objective and subjective indicators
Table 1 summarizes the joint distribution of the objective and subjective indicators of
economic welfare.  We assign individuals to categories of welfare ratios (ylz) in such a way that
the number of respondents in each category is equal to the number of respondents in the
corresponding subjective welfare group.  If there was a complete agreement between the two
then the number of respondents in the non-diagonal cells of Table 1 would be zero. We decided
to condense the highest 7th,  8th, and gth  rungs of the ELQ into one due to a small number of
14  The poverty line are from Popkin  et al., (1995).  These  were accepted  as the guideline  for all
official Russian poverty  line calculations. They are modified  versions  of those in Popkin et al. (1992)
which were accepted  as a law in Russian  Federation  in 1992  both on the regional and on the all Russia
levels. The main modification  is that the new poverty  lines allow  for economies  of scale in consumption.
11respondents who assigned themselves to these rungs (only 28 of the 7405 respondents put
themselves in rung 8 and only 3 put themselves on rung 9).
The matching of objective and subjective rankings is clearly weak. For example, of the
993 adults who said they were on the lowest rung of the ladder, only 224 were amongst the
poorest 993 adults in terms of y/z. The matrix is not even dominant diagonal, though it is not far
from it.  The value of Cramer's V statistic is under 0. 1, though the association between the two
variables is still highly significant." 5
Naturally then there is only a weak matching in terms of poverty; while 29.4% of adults
placed themselves in the lowest two rungs, less than half (43.0%) were also amongst the 32.7%
of adults living in households with incomes below the poverty line.  Figure 1 gives the mean
proportion of the sample on the lowest two rungs against ln(y/z). The curve is downward
sloping, but it is clearly quite flat, even near the poverty line. For example, going from 0.5
standard deviation below the poverty line to 0.5 above reduces the probability of being on the
lowest two rungs from 0.34 to 0.25 (the objective poverty measure falls from 1.0 to 0.0); going
"  Let n,. i=1,...j=J...,J,  be the number  of observations  in the i'th row andj'th  column.  The
Pearson  /  statistics  with (I-l) (J-1)  degrees  of freedom  is defined  as:




my  =nnn  n;  n  =  j  n;  n,=  n..;  n.  n- .
'i  'I  1  J  J=l  '=1
Cramer's V  is a measure of association  given  by:
V  =[(X 2/n)/min(I-,J_-1j)]112
for which O<Vl.  See Agresti (1984)  for further  discussion.
12from one standard  deviation  below  to one above,  it falls from 0.37 to 0.19. The standard
deviation  of ln(y/z)  is 1.053  so the slope  is -0.09 in both cases. So roughly doubling  incomes
will only reduce  the subjective  poverty  rate by about 10 percentage  points.
Figure 1 also gives  the mean proportion  of the sample  on rungs five-plus  at each value of
ln(y/z). This is roughly  the (subjectively)  richest  quarter  of respondents. Here we find near zero
gradient  in the proportion  of those  responding  that they  are on the fifth  rung or higher as ln(y/z)
increases;  amongst  the "objectively  poor" about one fifth  put themselves  on these upper  rungs of
the ladder, and it matters  little how  poor they are. But amongst  the "objectively  non-poor"  there
is a sharp increase  in the proportion  of respondents  who see themselves  as being on the upper
rungs of the ladder  as real income  deflated  by the poverty  line increases. It is in the responses  of
the income non-poor  that one sees  a sharper  differentiation  in subjective  perceptions  of welfare.
An instructive  way of looking  at the relationship  between  the subjective  and objective
indicators is to start from an explicit  assumption  about  the underlying  continuous  variable
determining  where one sees oneself  on the ladder  from "poor"  to "rich". Let this latent
continuous  variable  be denoted  w and assume that this is determined  by ln(y/z)  as well as other
variables, which  (for the moment)  we will simply  lump into an error term, E:
w = Pln(ylz) + s  (1)
Assuming  level comparability  of the ladder  across  persons,  someone  with w < cl (say)  will
respond that she is on the first rung;  someone  for whom  cl < w < c2 will be on the second,  and so
on up to the highest  rung. On also assuming  that E  is normally  distributed  (with distribution
function F), we can use an ordered  probit (OP) to model  the Cantril ladder  responses  (C):
13Prob(C=1) = F[c 1 - Oln(y/x)]
Prob(C=i)  = FTc,  - Oln(y/x)]  - F [c,_,  - ,Bln(y/x)]  (i =  2,..6)  (2)
Prob(C=7) =  1 - Fic6 - n/X)]
This estimation  method  gives  an estimate for ,B  of 0.195 with a standard error of 0.0116
(t-ratio of 16.8, with 7377  observations). 16 There is clearly  a highly significant  correlation
between  the subjective  and objective  welfare  indicators. However,  the correlation  is low. In
assessing  the fit of all OP models  in this paper we use the (normalized)  Aldrich-Nelson  pseudo
R2 since the standard  pseudo-R 2 (as calculated  in STATA,  for example)  is known to be biased
downward  for the types of models  we are estimating,  and there is evidence  that the Aldrich-
Nelson  R2performs better (see Appendix).  The Aldrich-Nelson  R2 is 0.047. So, while  the
welfare  ratio (as conventionally  measured)  is a highly significant  predictor  of a person's ladder
rung, it is clear that this variable  alone can only account  for a small  share  of the variance  (more
strictly,  the share of the restricted  log-likelihood  function)  in responses  to the ladder  question.
This result confirms the impression  from Table 1 that there are clearly  many other factors
influencing  subjective  perceptions  of economic  welfare besides  income.
What other factors  underlie  the differences  between  subjective  and objective  welfare?
We investigate  this question  more systematically  in the next section. But some simple
descriptive  statistics are revealing. In Figure 2 we give  various  "poverty  profiles" in which we
compare  the proportion  of adults  living in households  with an income  below the poverty  line
16  The estimated  values  of  c, (i=1,6)  are  -1.078  (st.  error  of 0.0186),  -0.503  (0.0157),  0.104
(0.01  50),  0.670  (0.0162),  1.597  (0.0234)  and  2.1358  (0.0342)  respectively.
14with the percentage placing themselves in rungs 1 or 2 of the ladder which we shall term
"subjective poverty". (By choosing the lowest two rungs, the overall subjective poverty rate is
roughly the same as the overall headcount index of income poverty, as noted above).
While income poverty incidence tends to fall (or not rise) with age, subjective poverty
clearly rises with age (panel a).  Higher education has the same effect on both poverty indicators
(panel b).  Income poverty rises with household size; by contrast, subjective poverty is highest
for single person households, falls as household size increases up to four persons, but then rises
again (panel c). Similarly to the difference in demographic poverty profiles in panels a and c, we
see a marked difference in the poverty rates amongst pensioners and large families (panel d).
There is also a marked geographic difference between the subjective and objective
geographic poverty profiles, as can be seen from Figure 2e where we rank regions by the
objective poverty rates by region in Russia (income relative to the poverty line) and give the
corresponding percentages of people reporting that they are on the bottom two rungs of the
ladder.  There is clearly little relationship between the two.
4.  Why do the subjective and objective indicators differ so much?
We now test two possible hypotheses as to why there is so much disagreement between
the subjective and objective indicators.
The Wrong Weights Hypothesis: As elsewhere, the Russian poverty lines depend on
regional cost-of-living diferences  and equivalence scales. The low correlation between objective
and subjective measures may be due to the weighting of these various components used in
constructing the objective indicator. An alternative weighting may give a much better fit.
15The Low Dimensionalitv Hypothesis: Even with an"ideal" deflator, the welfare ratio may
be too narrow a measure of "economic welfare ". Past incomes may matter as well as current
incomes. Health, education and employment may matter independently of income. And where
you live may matter, either directly or via perceptions of relative well-being.
4.1  Testing  the Wrong  Weights Hypothesis
The poverty lines are determined by a vector of variables x. and we now write this
relationship explicitly as z=z(x).  To test the Wrong Weights Hypothesis we want to compare the
function z(x:) with that which gives the best fit in explaining the subjective welfare indicator.  To
do so we estimate an augmented model in which the latent welfare function takes the form:
w = Pln[y/z(xz)]  + yzxz  +  ,  (3)
This allows the subjective weights on x, to differ from those built into the objective indicator.
The first column of Table 2 gives the estimates of the OP based on (3) and their standard
errors.  The second column gives the values of yjp.  This allows us to directly compare the
weights on x. with those built into the construction of the poverty lines, as given in the third
column.  The latter were obtained from an OLS regression of lnz(x:) on x_.2"
There is clearly strong support for the Wrong Weights Hypothesis.  In comparison to the
model in (1) we observe almost a threefold increase in the log-likelihood explanatory power of
the model by re-weighting x..  to give best fit in explaining the subjective indicator (pseudo-R 2
rises from 0.04 to 0.11).  Comparing columns (2) and (3) of Table 2, there are striking
17  While we know the precise  variables in x., the formula  used in obtaining  the Russian  poverty
lines  from x2  was not available.  However,  the fit of this semi-log  specification  is excellent,  indeed  there is
near perfect prediction  (Table 2), so we are clearly  very close  to the formula actually  used.
16differences  in the properties  of the equivalence  scale consistent  with the subjective  welfare
indicator  versus that used in the objective  poverty lines. The latter  has an elasticity  of 0.8 to
household  size, while the subjective  indicator  calls for an elasticity  half this size. This explains
the differences  in the poverty  rates  between  large and small households  in Figure 2c. The
demographic  composition  variables  behave  very differently.  Most notably,  due to the properties
of the poverty  lines, the objective  welfare  indicator  deems pensioner  households  to be less poor
than  others ceteris  paribus,  while the subjective  welfare indicator  tells us the exact opposite.
Table 3 gives the distribution  of the predicted  subjective  welfare  (based on the estimation
of the model  in Table 2) against  the actual.  One can see a significant  improvement  in the degree
of association;  Cramer's V is 0.14 as compared  to 0.10 in Table 1.
The lack of correspondence  between  the geographic  effects  is particularly  striking; Figure
3 gives  the regression  coefficients  on the geographic  dummy  variables  for both the objective  and
subjective  (,yjp)  welfare indicators. While  there are a number  of strong  geographic  effects  in
perceptions  of welfare,  they bear very little relationship  with the cost-of-living  differences  built
into  the objective  poverty lines.
While  there is support  for Wrong  Weights  Hypothesis,  income  and the variables  used in
constructing  the poverty lines  still explain  poorly the subjective  perceptions  of individuals.
4.2  Testing the Low Dimensionality Hypothesis
Next we investigate  whether  there are other dimensions  of welfare  which influence
answers  to the ELQ. The augmented  model  has the following  form:
w = P3In[yIz(x,)]  +  + yOx +  - (4)
17where  x 0 is a vector  of other variables  that  we hypothesize  matter to self-rated  economic  welfare
but are not in x.. Examples  include education,  health, marital  status, past incomes,  employment
and household  expenditure. 8 There are possible  concerns  about assuming  that these variables  are
exogenous.  People  with low self-rated  welfare  may  be more likely  to be divorced  or less likely  to
think they are healthy.  While  noting these concerns,  there is little that can be done about them
while retaining  a reasonably  rich extended  model  for testing  the Low Dimensionality  Hypothesis.
Table 4 gives  the OP estimation  of this extended model. The new set of variables  greatly
improves  the explanatory  power of the model,  as indicated  by the doubling  of pseudo R2 to 0.25.
The association  between  the predicted  and actual ranking  is stronger  (Table 5). We move from
Cramer's  V,=0.10  in model (1) to V 2= 0.14 in model (3) to V3=0.20 for model  (4).
The estimate  of  (4) shows  that many  variables  not included  in the objective  income
indicator  have a strong  influence  on subjective  welfare.  Last  year's income,  and total household
expenditure  have  positive and significant  effects  on subjective  welfare. The source  of income
does not appear  to matter.
Recall that the narrow  subjective  welfare  model  in Table  2 suggests  a much lower
elasticity  of the cost function  to household  size than embodied  in the poverty  lines,  which are
closer to the "per  capita" normalization.  This no longer holds in our extended  model in Table 4,
though the calculation  is complicated  by the fact that there are multiple "income"  variables.
Suppose  that there  is an equi-proportional  increase  in all household  incomes  (at all dates) and
expenditures,  and that household  size increases  by the same  proportion. Then it is readily
18  We  include  total  expenditure  as well  as income,  recognizing  that  there  is a debate  as  to which
of these  is the more  relevant  "income"  metric;  for further  discussion  see  Ravallion  (1994).
18verified from the estimates in Table 4 that subjective welfare will be virtually unchanged; more
precisely, the sum of the coefficients on the logged household incomes and expenditures is
0.287, which is close to (minus one times) the coefficient on household size (Table 4). Individual
income, however, matters independently of household income per capita.  Subjective economic
welfare clearly depends on both permanent household income per capita and individual income.
The fact that we found a size elasticity well below unity in the narrow model of Table 2 appears
to be attributable to the omission of this independent effect of individual income, rather than
scale effects on household consumption.'9
Among individual characteristics, middle-aged, divorced or widowed respondents put
themselves on a lower rung of the ladder controlling for income and household size. 20 Gender
makes no significant difference. Healthier people (by their own rating) have a higher self-
evaluation of their economic welfare. Higher education raises perceived welfare.  Unemployment
lowers it,2'  as does the fear of unemployment for those with a job (as measured by the perceived
risk of not finding other work if fired). The ownership of the durables such as car, washer, TV,
and VCR has a positive effect on the subjective welfare.
Note that all these effects are conditional on incomes and other household and individual
characteristics.  For example, unemployment lowers self-rated welfare controlling for income.
By implication, even with a very generous unemployment compensation scheme which restored
19 At mean individual  income,  the elasticity is 0.058.
20  The turning point for the derivative  with respect  to household  size is at 51 years.
21  This is consistent  with other  evidence  on the non-pecuniary  costs of unemployment.  See
Winkelmann  and Winkelmann  (1998)  for Germany.  Oswald  (1997)  reviews  the literature  on this issue.
19the individual's  entire working income,  unemployment  would still lower  subjective  welfare.
(Clearly  this is inconsistent  with claims  that there are adverse  effects  on work incentives  of
unemployment  compensation.) Similarly  our results are consistent  with the view that people
care about education  and health  independently  of their bearing  on incomes  (Sen, 1987).
What accounts  for the geographic  effects?  One possibility  is that they reflect perceptions
of relative  welfare,  in that (other  things  constant)  people in richer areas  will feel relatively  worse
off.  To test that explanation,  we replaced  the geographic  dummy  variables  by the mean of the log
welfare  ratio in the area of residence. 22 The result is in Table 4. Consistently  with the relative
welfare  explanation,  the mean objective  indicator  had a negative  effect  on subjective  welfare,  and
was highly significant  (the variable  had a coefficient  of -0.189  with a t-ratio of -4.104).
Furthermore  there was only a small  drop in pseudo  R2 to 0.237. So average  objective  welfare  in
the area  of residence  can account  for almost  all of the variance  attributable  to geographic  effects.
Other  coefficients  and standard  errors are affected  little.
However,  these results  do not suggest  that only relative  income matters.  Suppose  that all
incomes  and expenditures  increase  by the same proportion.  Subjective  welfare  will still increase;
the combined  effect  of a one percent  increase  in current  and past  household  incomes,  household
expenditure  and individual  income  (at sample  mean) is 0.345,  versus  -0.189  for income in the
area of residence.  So, while relative  income  in the area of residence  clearly  matters,  it is only one
factor;  absolute income also matters  to subjective  economic  welfare.
22  We  also  tried  the log  of the  mean,  but  this made  almost  no difference.  We  also  tried  including
the  difference  between  the log  of the  mean  and  the mean  of the log  to test for effects  of inequality,  but
this  variable  was  highly  insignificant.
205.  Conclusions
It is known  that the objective  measures  of economic  welfare  widely  used by economists,
such as real income  per equivalent  single adult, are under-identified  from consumer  demand
behavior.  Thus conventional  assessments  of whether  one person  is better off than another,  or has
gained  from a policy  change,  may disagree  with peoples' own assessments.
Using an integrated  survey  for Russia in 1996  we have studied  the determinants  of self-
rated economic  welfare,  and the relationship  with more  conventional  objective  measures.  We
find that Russian  adults with higher family income  per equivalent  adult are also less likely  to
place themselves  on the poorest  rungs of a subjective  ladder  of economic  welfare  from "poor"  to
"rich", and (at least amongst  the objectively  non-poor  by Russian  standards)  they  are more likely
to place themselves  on the upper rungs.
However,  measured  household  incomes  cannot  account  well for self-reported  assessments
of whether one is "poor"  or 'rich". The discrepancy  between  objective  and subjective  indicators
of economic  welfare  is due in part to the weighting  of the demographic  and geographic  variables
that go into the Russian  poverty  lines used for assessing  differences  in needs at a given income.
If we re-weight  these  variables  to accord  with the subjective  indicator  then the power  of the
objective  welfare  measure  in explaining  the variance  in subjective  economic  welfare  goes up
substantially.  Nonetheless,  we still find that the bulk of the differences  between  people in their
survey responses  about  their perceived  economic  welfare  are left un-explained.
It is clear that the information  normally  incorporated  into assessments  of who is "poor"
have rather limited  explanatory  power  for the subjective  assessments  we have studied  here.
When we expand  the set of variables  to include  incomes  at different  dates, expenditures,  and
21educational  attainments,  health status,  employment  and average  income  in the area of residence
we can double  the explanatory  power.  Healthier  and better educated  adults with jobs perceive
themselves  to be better off controlling  for their incomes.  The unemployed  judge their economic
welfare  to be lower,  even with full income  replacement.  Individual  income  matters independently
of household  income  per capita (and it is this fact which appears  to account  for why subjective
welfare  is more elastic to household  income  than to household  size,  rather than scale effects  in
consumption).  Relative income clearly  also matters,  in that living in a richer area lowers
perceived  economic  welfare, controlling  for own income and other characteristics.
So while our results confirm  that even narrowly  measured  income  gains  raise subjective
perceptions  of economic  welfare, they  also suggest  that the ways in which  poverty  is
conventionally  measured  - the equivalence  scales,  regional  cost-of-living  deflators  and so on - do
not accord  well with subjective  perceptions  of who is "poor". Indeed,  economists  should  not
expect  to be able to predict well peoples' own  perceptions  of their economic  welfare from even a
quite broad set of conventional  objective  socio-economic  data. Idiosyncratic  and possibly
transient  differences  in respondent's  "moods"  may well account  for some  of the unexplained
differences  in self-rated  welfare found  in our data. For certain  purposes,  including  assessments  of
welfare  impacts  of policies and of overall  social progress,  one may  choose  to discount  such
differences. However,  the systematic  inconsistencies  between a conventional  objective  measure
and self-rated  assessments  suggest  that greater  caution is needed  in the interpretations  that
economists  and others routinely  give  to conventional  metrics of welfare.
22Appendix: The Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo-R 2
McFadden's  (1974)  pseudo-R 2 is widely  used for probits and ordered  probits and is
programmed  in packages  such as STATA. If L 1, is the log-likelihood  value of the unrestricted
discrete  dependent  variable  model  and L is the log-likelihood  value if the non-intercept
coefficients  are restricted  to zero  then the McFadden  pseudo-R 2 is
2  _L-Lr
R-  =  M  L
Veall and Zimmerman  (1996)  show that for the discrete  dependent  variable  models  with more
than three categories  the McFadden's  pseudo-R 2 is biased  downward  and the bias worsens  with
as the number  of categories  increases.  To correct  this, Veall and Zimmerman  suggest  different
measures.  One  of the best measures  according  to Monte-Carlo  simulations  is the normalized
Aldrich  and Nelson (1990)  R2:
R 2 =  M
AN ~  L
[(Lr-N2)  ]
This an upper bound  of one whenever  the observed  dependent  variable is discrete.
The bias in the standard  pseudo-R 2 appears  to be large in our application. The standard  R2
for the subjective  welfare  measure in Table 1 is 0.027 (versus  0.111 using the Normalized
Aldrich-Nelson  measure);  for the extended  model  it is 0.067 (versus 0.241).
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incomerank  1  2  3  4  5  6  7+  Total
1  224  180  196  196  156  34  7  993
2  204  234  279  208  192  28  26  1171
3  244  287  405  332  306  65  35  1674
4  164  245  362  349  325  68  19  1532
5  126  194  340  352  400  90  28  1530
6  25  22  67  72  98  25  18  327
7+  6  9  25  23  53  17  17  150
Total  993  1171  1674  1532  1530  327  150  7377
Note: Cramer's V = 0.0991;  Chi-square  = 434 (significant  at prob<0.0005).
29Table  2: Comparison  of the weights  on the variables  used to construct  the poverty  lines
Subjective  welfare  Objective  welfare
indicator  indicator
(1)  (2)  (3)
Ordered  probit  rX  OLS
Coefficie  St. Error  Ratio  St. Error  Coefficie  St. Error
nt  nt
Log of total household  income  0.223  0.012  1.000  0.000  1.000  0.000
Log of household  size  -0.094  0.034  -0.420  0.148  -0.802  0.001
Household  composition  variables
Proportion  of small children  0.571  0.112  2.558  0.512  -0.048  0.003
Proportion  of older children  0.492  0.077  2.205  0.363  -0.387  0.002
Proportion  of adult men  0.266  0.064  1.193  0.299  -0.620  0.001
Proportion  of adult women  0.363  0.060  1.624  0.293  -0.368  0.001
Proportion  of pensioners  Reference
Month of interview  dummies
Month  1  Reference
Month  2  0.030  0.032  0.133  0.145  -0.012  0.001
Month  3  0.116  0.055  0.521  0.247  -0.025  0.001
Geographic  dummies
Territory  1  Reference
Territory  2  -0.287  0.095  -1.287  0.443  0.048  0.002
Territory  3  0.018  0.091  0.082  0.409  -0.176  0.002
Territory  4  -0.003  0.068  -0.015  0.302  -0.001  0.002
Territory  5  0.006  0.062  0.026  0.279  0.145  0.001
Territory  6  0.124  0.068  0.556  0.299  0.202  0.002
Territory  7  0.109  0.064  0.487  0.280  0.035  0.001
Territory  8  0.314  0.062  1.405  0.272  0.153  0.001
Territory  9  0.160  0.073  0.718  0.321  0.163  0.002
Territory  10  0.145  0.069  0.648  0.311  -0.023  0.002
Territory 11  0.079  0.075  0.352  0.336  0.013  0.002
Territory 12  0.045  0.075  0.202  0.334  0.011  0.002
Territory 13  0.142  0.065  0.638  0.292  -0.098  0.001
Territory 14  0.310  0.073  1.388  0.325  -0.397  0.002
Constant  -12.235  0.001
30Ancillary  parameters
c,  2.210  0.178
*2  2.803  0.179
C3  3.432  0.180
c4  4.015  0.180
*5  4.966.  0.182
C6  5.520  0.185
Pseudo-R2 0.111
R2 (for poverty lines)  0.983
Note: 7377 observations.




-Table 3  1  2  3  4  5  6  7+  Total
I  271  223  222  149  108  18  2  993
2  211  270  276  202  190  12  10  1171
3  231  285  413  323  331  56  35  1674
4  162k  215  376  360  310  79  30  1532
5  96  151  310  388  425  116  44  1530
6  15  23  56  83  113  27  10  327
7+  7  4  21  27  53  19  19  150
Total  993  1171  1674  1532  1530  327  150  7377
Note: Cramer's  V = 0.1376; Chi-square  836 (significant at prob<0.0005).
31Table 4: An extended model of the subjective welfare indicator
Coefficient  St. Error  Coefficient  St. Error
Household  income
Log  of total household  income,  round  7  0.104***  0.017  0.089***  0.018
Log  of total household  income,  round  6  0.070***  0.017  0.051**  0.017
Log  of total household  income,  round 5  0.026  0.020  0.019  0.019
Coefficient  of variation  in 3-year  income  (x  100)  0.044  0.050  0.045  0.050
Wages  from government  enterprises  0.034  0.151  -0.145  0.154
Wages  from private  enterprises  0.061  0.157  -0.150  0.159
Wages  from foreign  enterprises  0.046  0.158  -0.117  0.160
Income  from rent  -1.263*  0.670  -1.259*  0.671
Investment  0.395  0.306  0.186  0.308
Income  from home production  0.062  0.153  -0.102  0.155
Other  income sources  -0.121  0.154  -0.281  0.157
Government  subsidies  (pensions,  etc.)  -0.141  0.153  -0.310  0.156
Household  consumption
Total  household  expenditure  (x10000)  0.123***  0.022  0.1  12***  0.021
Share  of household non-food  expenditure  0.230***  0.075  0.170**  0.074
Household  characteristics
Log  of household  size  -0.256***  0.043  -0.266***  0.043
Proportion  of small  children  0.019  0.148  0.049  0.147
Proportion  of big children  0.045  0.104  0.071  0.103
Proportion  of adult men  -0.317***  0.087  -0.303***  0.087
Proportion  of adult women  -0.104  0.083  -0.066  0.083
Proportion  of pensioners  Reference
Highest  household  educational  level (University)  -0.095**  0.044  -0.088**  0.044
Households  with non-university  highest  level  Reference
Individual  characteristics
Individual  income (/10000)  0.283***  0.046  0.292***  0.045
Age (x1O)  -0.499***  0.054  -0.499***  0.054
Age squared  (xlOO)  0.049***  0.059  0.049***  0.059
Male  0.018  0.032  0.016  0.032
Female  Reference
Single  Reference
Married  0.081  *  0.051  0.096*  0.051
Divorced  -0.161**  0.069  -0.165**  0.068
Widowed  -0.204**  0.071  -0.193**  0.071
Has  job  0.089  0.076  0.083  0.076
Uncertain  of finding a  job in case  of unemployment  -0.167***  0.038  -0.166***  0.038
32Table 4 (continued):
Coefficient  St. Error  Coefficient  St. Error
Self-evaluation of health
Very good  Reference
Good  -0.218*  0.112  -0.257*  0.112
Normal  -0.358***  0.113  -0.414***  0.112
Bad  -0.610***  0.119  -0.657***  0.118
Very bad  -0.880***  0.147  -0.921***  0.146
Education
High school  -0.143**  0.059  -0.126**  0.059
Technical/Vocational  -0.068  0.057  -0.057  0.057
University  Reference
Occupation
Officials managers  0.316**  0.182  0.345**  0.181
Professionals  0.066  0.087  0.072  0.086
Technicians and assistant profession  0.143**  0.085  0.137**  0.084
Clerks  -0.008  0.099  -0.019  0.099
Service, shop, market worker  -0.035  0.095  -0.009  0.094
Skilled agricultural and fishery  0.381*  0.233  0.353*  0.233
Craft and related work  0.021  0.083  0.016  0.082
Plant machinery operation assembly  -0.052  0.083  -0.073  0.082
Manual labor  -0.026  0.087  -0.030  0.086
Armed force  -0.367**  0.175  -0.392  0.175
Unemployed  -0.226***  0.064  -0.229***  0.063
Month I  Reference
Month 2  0.012  0.036  0.014  0.035
Month 3  0.096  0.063  0.108  0.061
Geographic variables
Territory I  Reference
Territory 2  -0.149  0.106
Territory 3  0.151  0.102
Territory 4  0.083  0.077
Territory 5  0.238***  0.072
Territory 6  0.384***  0.078
Territory 7  0.372***  0.074
Territory 8  0.472***  0.072
Territory 9  0.357***  0.084
Territory 10  0.277***  0.079
33Table 4 (continued):
Coefficient  St. Error  Coefficient  St. Error
Territory  11  0.257***  0.086
Territory 12  0.264***  0.086
Territory  13  0.137*  0.075
Territory  14  0.332***  0.084
Mean log of income  in the territory  -0.189***  0.046
Assets  and durables
Car or truck  0.150***  0.033  0.148***  0.033
Summer  house  -0.034  0.041  -0.023  0.041
House  -0.042  0.038  -0.012  0.038
Freezer  0.129**  0.057  0.107**  0.054
Refrigerator  0.033  0.064  0.004  0.064
Washer  0.180***  0.039  0.175***  0.038
TV B/W  0.092**  0.032  0.083**  0.032
TV Color  0.177***  0.041  0.175***  0.041
VCR  0.253***  0.035  0.228***  0.034
Ancillary  parameters
a,  0.450  0.441  0.282  0.421
a2 1.102  0.441  0.930  0.421
a 3 1.787  0.442  1.611  0.422
a4 2.425  0.442  2.246  0.422
a5 3.455  0.443  3.271  0.423
a6 4.047  0.444  3.859  0.424
Pseudo-R 2 0.241  0.237
Note: * is significant at 10%  level; **  is significant at 5% level; *** is significant at 1%  level. 6256
observations. Individual income is not logged, because there are many zeros. The mean individual
income is 1966 rubbles per month (3182 if calculated only on positive incomes).




values  based  1  2  3  4  5  6  7+  Total
on Table 5
1  311  247  152  75  56  5  3  849
2  207  216  284  163  131  14  3  1018
3  164  248  412  310  253  30  15  1432
4  111  188  310  333  292  56  20  1310
5  54  104  226  340  398  93  50  1265
6  2  11  39  69  86  39  16  262
7+  0  4  9  20  49  25  13  120
Total  849  1018  1432  1310  1265  262  120  6256
Note:  Cramer's V = 0.2009; Chi-square  =  1558  (significant  at prob<0.0005).
35Figure  1: Subjective  Poverty  and  Affluence Against  the Objective  Welfare Indicator
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